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Abstract: Although we are enthusiastic about a Darwinian approach to 
culture, we argue that the overview presented  in the target article does 
not sulTicientlv em phasize the crucial explanatory role that psvchologv 
plavs in the studv ol culture. W e use a num ber ol examples to illustrate 
the varietv ol wavs bv which appeal to psychological I actors can help 
explain cultural phenom ena.
The target article makes three main claims. The first, a claim 
about culture itself, maintains that culture exhibits key D arwi­
nian evolutionary properties. The second and third claims are 
about the studv of culture. According to the second, research 
on culture can and should take a broadlv Darwinian stance that 
borrows manv of the theoretical assumptions, analytic tools, 
and experimental methods of evolutionary biology. The third 
claim is an account of a unifying framework within which that 
research should be organized: “the structure of a science of 
cultural evolution should broadlv resemble the structure of 
evolutionary biology” (sect. 1, para. 2). Though we agree 
w holeheartedly with the first two claims, we find the third less 
convincing. For while the proposed account is useful, it is also 
im portantly incom plete because it fails to clarify or sufficiently 
emphasize the central explanatory role that psychology  is likely 
to play in the em erging science of culture.
Research lias already shown that a num ber o f features o f the 
species-typical hum an psychological endow m ent influence cul­
tural evolution along a varietv of dimensions. F or instance, the 
content of some cultural variants makes them  more likely to be 
socially transm itted than others, and the increased frequency of 
such variants is often explained bv the influence o f co n ten t 
biases on social transmission processes. These content biases 
are, in turn, often explained bv appeal to the operation and p ro ­
perties o f psychological mechanisms. For example, TIeatli et al. 
(2001) showed how the psvchologv' o f disgust can influence the 
horizontal transmission of cultural variants. They found that 
the more likelv an urban legend was to trigger disgust, thej  O  O O  O  7
more likelv it was to be passed along to peers and to appear on 
urban legend Wei) sites. Nichols (2002) showed that disgust 
can also bias the vertical transmission of cultural variants. Tie 
found that etiquette norms of the fifteenth and sixteenth cen tu­
ries that prohibited actions likelv to induce disgust were signifi­
cantly m ore likelv to have survived to the present than those 
that did not.
Appeal to psychological mechanisms can also help uncover and 
explain other im portant regularities relevant to the science of 
culture. Fessler and Navarrete (2003) showed that although 
details differ from one culture to the next, taboos regulating the7 O O
consumption of m eat were found in nearly all investigated cul­
tures. The cross-cultural recurrence of m eat taboos is explained, 
in part, bv psychological factors, specifically the salience of m eat 
to the hum an disgust mechanism. M achery and Fauclier (2005; 
forthcoming) call attention to another instance of the pattern  of 
local variations on a them e that is p resent in all or most cultures. 
Although races are conceptualized differently across cultures, a 
common them e is identifiable in the various conceptualizations: 
Races are cross-culturally conceptualized as biological entities. 
Following Gil-White (2001), Machery and Fauclier argue that 
this puzzling regularity is explained bv the character of the 
psychological mechanisms that underlie racial cognition: The 
observable cues associated with race mistakenly trigger a hypoth­
esized system for e thn ic  cognition, and that system employs a folk 
biological mechanism as one of its constituent subsystems.
O ther, m ore comprehensive projects, such as the recent work 
on religions and religious beliefs (Boyer 2001; Atran 2002), offer 
additional rich and suggestive examples o f the substantive expla­
natory role psychology can play in the investigation of culture. 
Although the complex intersection of psychological and cultural 
phenom ena is not vet completely understood, these examples 
begin to illustrate the range of wavs in which psychological 
factors have already been shown to exert profound influence on 
social transmission and cultural evolution. This suggests 1:0 usO O
that psychology should be deeply integrated into the foundations 
o f a science of culture.
This perspective points to potentially fruitful lines o f future 
inquiry as well. For instance, some of the most promising theor­
etic work on cultural evolution might be enhanced bv more 
detailed psychological research. Theoretical models and experi­
mental evidence show that the transmission of cultural variants 
is strongly influenced not just bv their content, bu t also bv the 
local social context of their transmission: Conformity and prestige 
biases lead people to adopt, respectively cultural variants 
common among their peers, and variants adopted bv prestigious 
m em bers of their culture (Boyd & Riclierson 1985; 2005). In 
much of that work, conformity and prestige are characterized 
beliaviorally and little is vet known about the nature o f the 
psychological mechanisms underlying conformity and prestige 
biases (though see TTenricli & Gil-W hite 2001; McElreatli e t al. 
2005). Discovering more about those mechanisms’ internal struc­
ture, the observable cues in the social environm ent to which they 
are sensitive, and the m anner in which they process information 
about those cues promises to shed light on the cultural evolution­
ary dynamics that they influence. Perhaps m ore im portant, as in 
the case o f racial cognition, idiosyncrasies uncovered in the func­
tioning o f the psychological mechanisms underlying conformity 
and prestige bias could provide resources for explaining the 
more puzzling aspects o f the cultural phenom ena they affect.
D espite the valuable overview provided bv the target article, 
the organizational framework it proposes does little to emphasize 
or elucidate the significance of such psychological factors in 
explaining cultural phenom ena, and thus leaves an im portant 
ingredient out o f its account. Perhaps this indicates that the simi­
larity to evolutionary biology is at best a partial one, and that 
nothing in evolutionary biology corresponds to the central role 
we maintain psychology will play in the studv of cultural evo­
lution. A lternatively it could indicate that the analogy indeed 
holds, bu t the account o f evolutionary biology is incom plete as 
well. Indeed, psychological factors such as sensory biases have 
been shown to have a powerful influence on biological evolution 
via the process o f sexual selection (Miller 2000). E ither wav, we 
agree with the authors that such limitations do not “invalidate” an 
evolutionary approach to culture. Rather, they suggest that the 
account needs to be enriched to underscore the im portant role 
o f psychology in the studv of culture.
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2006) 29:4 3 55
